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Abstract: This study evaluates the transmission range requirements of Connected Vehicles (CVs) at
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings (HRGCs) in terms of safety improvement. The safety improvement
of HRGCs is evaluated by using a reliability-based risk analysis that calculates risk of collision
for CVs and non-CVs. Trains are assumed to have onboard units that transmit train location and
speed information to CVs via vehicle to vehicle communications. The stopping distance and time
to collision of a vehicle are the demand functions in reliability-based risk analysis. The demand
functions consist of probability density functions of a vehicle’s initial speed, perception-reaction
time, initial deceleration rate, final speed, and final deceleration rate. Train arrival time depending
on the train speed and transmission range is the supply threshold for calculating the CV’s risk of
collision at passive HRGCs. The transmission range’s projected highway distance is the supply
threshold for CVs at active HRGCs. After deriving probability density functions of demand functions
from the published data, Monte Carlo simulations generate the probabilities or risks that a CV
would fail to stop within the transmission range or train arrival time. With the provision of a 600 m
transmission range, the risk of collision for the CV is lower than that for the non-CV with a 300 m
sight distance to the train at the passive HRGC. The CV’s risk of collision is lower than the non-CV’s
with a 300 m transmission range at active HRGCs. The CV application at HRGCs can improve
safety by reducing CVs’ risk of collision. A 600 m transmission range is desirable at passive HRGCs.
A 300 m transmission is sufficient for CVs at active HRGCs. Overall, a 600 m transmission range is
feasible to improve the safety at passive and active HRGCs.
Keywords: connected vehicles; highway-rail grade crossings; reliability-based risk analysis;
transmission range

1. Introduction
Highway-rail grade crossings (HRGCs) are locations with continuing safety issues despite work
done to improve their safety. The total number of incidents, injuries, and deaths at public HRGCs
in the U.S. has declined over the last 10 years; however, 2060 incidents, 990 injuries, and 237 deaths
still occurred in 2015 [1]. These injuries and deaths incur primary (direct, indirect, and intangible)
and secondary (supply chain business disruption) costs [2]. Active HRGCs have more incidents,
injuries, and deaths than passive HRGCs for they are located in higher traffic areas and more likely to
incur incidents [3]. However, safety devices at active HRGCs have a higher incident prevention rate
than stop or yield signs at passive HRGCs, when traffic volumes and number of trains are taken into
account [4]. The major cause of incidents at active HRGCs is drivers’ violation of control devices [5].
Impatient drivers rush the gates as they think no train will arrive soon based on their experiences [6].
Likewise, passive HRGCs experience a high level of noncompliance to stop signs. A field study of
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seven passive HRGCs in Kansas shows that 79% (1913 out of 2421) of drivers did not stop in front
of stop signs [7]. Another field study in Australia shows that 59% of drivers are not compliant to
stop signs [8]. Kasalica et al. [9] found that 8 out of 35 drivers (23%) did not stop or slow down after
perceiving an approaching train at a passive HRGC in Serbia. Driver violations are the main cause of
incidents at HRGCs, and a new technology has the potential to mitigate the problem by providing
train information to drivers directly.
Safety devices, such as flashing light signals, automatic gates, or other infrastructure are used
to improve safety for active HRGCs with high incident rates. Passive HRGCs have crossbucks, stop
or yield signs and are typically located in rural areas or areas with lower traffic volumes and lower
numbers of trains. Drivers may be aware of the traffic control devices by auditory or visual stimulus
when they are sufficiently close (within sight distance) to active HRGCs. At passive HRGCs, drivers
need to locate the trains by themselves to make sure there are no approaching trains before crossing.
However, some drivers are not aware of approaching trains for various reasons, or they perceive trains
but make the wrong decision of proceeding or stopping, resulting in incidents [10]. Drivers’ negligence
or misjudgment of a train’s arrival time results in an incident. Essentially, drivers at any HRGC have
higher risks if they are unable to perceive approaching trains in time and make correct decisions to
avoid collisions. The current protection mechanism providing auditory or visual warnings may not be
sufficient for drivers to know exactly when an approaching train will arrive.
It is expected that injuries and deaths at HRGCs can be further reduced if a new system can
provide train information to drivers directly. Given the train speed and arrival time, drivers can
have a better chance to make the correct decision and avoid collisions. Wireless communication
methods can transmit train information from a train to highway vehicles. The emergence of Connected
Vehicle (CV) technology provides the wireless communication network for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
safety applications. The CV technology uses dedicated short-range communications to enable V2V
information exchange using onboard units (OBUs). The U.S. Department of Transportation announces
the proposed rules for mandating V2V communications on light vehicles [11] paving the way to
improving safety at HRGCs in the future. The concept of direct communications between a train and
vehicles had been proposed by Hartong et al. [12]. OBUs had been installed on trucks and transit
vehicles in the safety pilot model deployment [13]. An OBU can also be installed on a train that is
similar to the installation on a vehicle. When a train is equipped with an OBU, a highway vehicle’s
OBU can receive the train information and evaluate the risk of collision based on its own with the
train’s speed, location, and heading. An OBU consisting of V2V communication and driver-vehicle
interfaces can provide visual, auditory, or haptic warnings to drivers if any risk exceeds a threshold. CV
drivers may maneuver their vehicles to avoid potential incidents after perceiving the onboard warning.
In this study, it is assumed that OBUs are installed on CVs and approaching trains, other assumptions
regarding the driver, highway, train and HRGC will be specified in the problem formulation section.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the transmission range requirements of CV application at
HRGCs from the perspective of safety improvement. The problem is formulated as a reliability-based
risk analysis with the demand variable acting as a probability density function [14]. With the supply
variable given as a safety threshold, the probability of exceeding the threshold (deterministic) is defined
as the risk of collision (a probability between 0 and 1). The supply variables are the sight distance
and transmission range for non-CVs and CVs. The transmission range of V2V communications is a
function transmission power. The higher the transmission power, the longer the transmission range.
Based on the performance requirements defined in SAE J2945/1 [15], the minimum transmission range
for V2V safety applications is 300 m. However, considering the safety requirements at HRGCs, a train’s
OBU can transmit at a higher power level to extend the transmission range over 300 m. The demand
variables are the stopping distance and time to collision at active and passive HRGCs. The details of
reliability-based risk analysis are elucidated in the next section.
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2. Methods
2.1. Reliability-Based Risk Analysis
Reliability theory incorporates the uncertainty of the supply and demand variables in the
performance function to generate the risk of failure. The simplest system includes one demand
and one supply variable in the performance function [16]. When demand and supply variables are
Probability Density Functions (PDF), the expected value and standard deviation of the difference
between demand and supply variables can be calculated if both variables are normally distributed.
A function’s PDF can be obtained by using exact methods if the function only has two variables. Exact
methods are unable to work when more than two variables are in the limit state function—or when
this limit state function is non-linear, or the variables are not normally distributed [17]. Approximate
methods including the first- and second-order reliability methods were developed to solve this problem.
Both methods transform a reliability analysis problem into an approximate optimization problem. Such
a transformation comes with two premises: the number of random variables should be limited, and
the problem should be lightly nonlinear to avoid large bias in the estimation [18]. Unlike approximate
methods, the Monte Carlo Method [19] defines a domain of possible input variables, defines how these
input variables are generated randomly from their PDFs over the domain, performs a deterministic
computation for the input variables, and aggregates or analyzes the results statistically. Essentially,
a Monte Carlo simulation randomly generates input variable values a large number of times and
aggregates the result as a PDF for further analysis. When a function consisting of multiple variables
and no closed form is available, Monte Carlo simulation is an efficient and effective tool to solve the
problem. Since several input variables are expected in the demand function of problem formulation,
Monte Carlo simulation will be used to calculate the risk of collision at HRGCs.
2.2. Problem Formulation
The risk of collision can be measured from the perspective of time and space. If a vehicle is unable
to stop in time, then it may collide with an arriving train at passive HRGCs. If a vehicle is unable
to stop in front of an active HRGC with gates, then it may collide with the gate. CV drivers receive
train information from approaching trains at passive HRGCs, and the risk of collision is evaluated
based on time to collision. CV drivers may also receive train information from an approaching train
at active HRGCs, the risk of collision is evaluated based on their stopping distances. Only the CV
without preceding vehicles approaching an HRGC that may collide with a train or a gate is considered
as the CV with the potential risk of collision. At passive HRGCs, non-CV drivers need to perceive
an approaching train by the visual (train) or auditory (horn) stimulus, and the risk is the potential
collision with the train. At active HRGCs, the risk is considered as the potential collision with the
infrastructure for non-CV drivers. A vehicle may go around the gates; however, this type of driver
behavior is not considered in the problem formulation as vehicles may have already stopped or slowed
down before crossing.
2.2.1. Assumptions
The following conditions are assumed at the passive and active HRGCs where the CV application
is implemented.

•
•
•
•
•
•

A single track and two-lane highway
Straight sections with no curves on the highway
The highway–rail intersecting angle is 90◦
The highway pavement is dry to provide sufficient friction for deceleration
No line of sight obstruction between highway vehicles and the approaching train
The sight distance to train is 300 m under fair weather conditions
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The speed of an approaching train is constant
CV drivers are obedient to the onboard warning of a train arrival to stop their vehicles
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Figure 1. Transmission range for CVs and sight distance for non-CVs.
Figure 1. Transmission range for CVs and sight distance for non-CVs.
Table1.
1.Supply
SupplyVariables.
Variables.
Table
HRGC

Vehicle

Active

CV
Non-CV
CV
CV
Non-CV
Non-CV

HRGC

Active
Active
Passive
Active
Passive
Passive
Passive

Vehicle

CV
Non-CV

Sight/Transmission
Sight/Transmission
Train
ArrivalHighway Distance
Highway Supply Threshold
Supply
Train Arrival
Time
Distance *
Distance *
Time
Distance
Threshold
TR
≥20 s
TR Cosθ1
TR Cosθ1
SDG TR
≥20 s ≥20 s
SDTR
G
SDTR
G
Cosθ1
Cosθ1
TR SD
TR Sinθ1/V
T
TR CosθSD
1
TR Sinθ1/V
T
≥
20
s
SD
G
G
G
SDT Sinθ2/VT
SDT Cosθ2
SDT Sinθ2/VT
SDT
TR
TR Sinθ1 /VT
TR Cosθ1
TR Sinθ1 /VT

* All SD
theT variables are SD
defined
in Figure 1. SDT Cosθ2
T Sinθ2 /VT

SDT Sinθ2 /VT

* All the variables are defined in Figure 1.

For active HRGCs equipped with gates and flashers, the warning time shall be at least 20 s before
the train arrival as regulated by the Code of Federal Regulations [20]. When the gate is lowering, a
For active HRGCs equipped with gates and flashers, the warning time shall be at least 20 s before
vehicle may collide with the gate whether the approaching train has arrived or not. Train arrival time
the train arrival as regulated by the Code of Federal Regulations [20]. When the gate is lowering,
becomes an indirect factor in the safety modeling at active HRGCs for vehicles are protected by the
a vehicle may collide with the gate whether the approaching train has arrived or not. Train arrival
gates. Therefore, the supply threshold would be considered from the perspective of sight distance at
time becomes an indirect factor in the safety modeling at active HRGCs for vehicles are protected by
active HRGCs. As for passive HRGCs, the supply threshold is considered from the perspective of
the gates. Therefore, the supply threshold would be considered from the perspective of sight distance
TTC. Essentially, both CVs and non-CVs need to stop in time before a train arrives at a passive HRGC.
at active HRGCs. As for passive HRGCs, the supply threshold is considered from the perspective of
TTC. Essentially, both CVs and non-CVs need to stop in time before a train arrives at a passive HRGC.
2.2.3. Demand Functions
Stopping distance defines the necessary distance for highway vehicles to stop safely in front of
an obstacle. Stopping distance is a function of vehicle speed, perception-reaction time, deceleration
rate, and grade based on the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials [21]
definition. When a driver applies the brake to decelerate from moving to a complete stop, the braking
action should be continuous. That means the driver’s foot should keep pressing on the brake pedal
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2.2.3. Demand Functions
Stopping distance defines the necessary distance for highway vehicles to stop safely in front of
an obstacle. Stopping distance is a function of vehicle speed, perception-reaction time, deceleration
rate, and grade based on the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials [21]
definition. When a driver applies the brake to decelerate from moving to a complete stop, the braking
action should be continuous. That means the driver’s foot should keep pressing on the brake pedal
until the vehicle comes to a stop. The deceleration rate is an average of the exerting braking force
during the braking process. However, if the driver presses the brake initially and loosens it for a short
time then presses it again, the deceleration rates of the two braking phases can be different.
Drivers tend to decelerate in a discontinuous manner when they are approaching HRGCs [22,23].
Drivers tend to reduce their speeds when they initially perceive risks. If the risk is not imminent,
then the deceleration may not be continuous. The first phase of deceleration is mild for some drivers,
and it is followed by the second phase of deceleration that the deceleration rate is higher than that of
the first phase. At passive HRGCs, as drivers approach, it is assumed that they try to locate a train
in the perception-reaction time. When a train is perceived, some drivers may start to decelerate at
this moment, but the deceleration is mild without the intention to stop completely. At active HRGCs,
drivers may just stop stepping on the accelerator or brake slightly as the HRGC is still far away.
This process is the first phase of deceleration. When they see that a train is approaching, or warning
lights are flashing, a solid brake will be applied to stop the vehicle completely. This process is the
second phase of deceleration. Essentially, this stopping process can be divided into three parts: the
perception-reaction time to locate the train, initial braking, and full braking [23]. Equation (1) [2] is to
model the three-phase stopping behavior found at HRGCs. The second and third terms in Equation
(1) denote the initial and final braking distances. As analyzed in the previous section, train arrival
time is the supply threshold for CVs and non-CVs at passive HRGCs, and the corresponding demand
function is TTC. Equation (2) denotes TTC of the stopping maneuver. The second and third terms in
Equation (2) denote the initial and final braking times.
d = 0.278 Vi t +

TTC = t +

Vi2 − Vf2
ai
254( 9.81
± G)

Vi − Vf
ai
35.3( 9.81

± G)

+

+

Vf2
a

f
254( 9.81
± G)

Vf
a

f
35.3( 9.81
± G)

(1)

(2)

where
d = stopping distance (m),
Vi = initial vehicle speed (km/h),
Vf = final vehicle speed (km/h),
t = perception-reaction time (s),
ai = initial deceleration rate (m/s2 ),
af = final deceleration rate (m/s2 ),
G = grade, and
TTC = time to collision.
The demand function is the stopping distance the active HRGCs, and the demand function is TTC
at passive HRGCs. Equations (3) and (4) define the risk of collision as the probabilities of stopping
distance and TTC above the supply thresholds.
R D = P(Vi t +

Vi2 − Vf2

Vf2
 > sD )
+ 
2( ai ± 9.81G ) 2 a ± 9.81G
f

(3)
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R T = P(t +

Vi − Vf
Vf
 > sT )
+
( ai ± 9.81G )
a f ± 9.81G

(4)

where
R D = risk of collision for stopping distance,
R T = risk of collision for TTC,
s D =supply threshold of stopping distance,
s T =supply threshold of TTC.
Monte Carlo simulations require PDFs of all stochastic variables in the demand function. The PDFs
of stopping distance and TTC at HRGCs can be obtained by plugging the PDFs of all variables into
Equations (3) and (4) (assuming grade is zero). With the assumption that perception-reaction time
and vehicle speeds are normally distributed, and the deceleration rates are log-normally distributed,
the histogram of stopping distance can be generated from simulations. The statistical package R
(version 2.15.3) is used to perform these simulations. The risk of collision can be obtained by calculating
the probability of overshooting a designated distance and TTC.
2.3. Data Sources
The data sources consist of field vehicle speeds and deceleration data at HRGCs, and drivers’
perception-reaction data from driving simulators. The data sources of active HRGCs are based on
the data collected by Moon and Coleman [23] at two active HRGCs—Hartford and McLean in the
Chicago–St. Louis high-speed passenger rail corridor. Only the single vehicle data from both sites are
used in this study. The research of Tey et al. [22] using an HRGC driving simulator provides detail
distance statistics (means and standard errors) of accelerator release, initial braking, and final braking
for two initial speeds (60 and 80 kph). The PDFs of all variables in the demand functions are defined in
Table 2 [24].
Table 2. PDFs of Stochastic Variables in the Demand Function
Vehicle

PDF

Non-CV

Non-CV

Non-CV

CV

Normal
Normal
Log-normal
Normal
Log-normal

McLean
Active
(mean, standard
deviation)
(3.13, 1.59)
(17.24, 1.9)
(0.51, 0.27)
(14.2, 1.42)
(1.19, 0.56)

Hartford
Active
(mean, standard
deviation)
(3.13, 1.59)
(18.92, 2.1)
(0.63, 0.39)
(16.85, 1.85)
(0.85, 0.47)

Simulator
Passive
(mean, standard
deviation)
(3.22, 1.69)
(16.5, 1.6)
(0.73, 0.43)
(12.32, 1.47)
(1.64, 0.56)

Simulator
Onboard
(mean, standard
deviation)
(3.21, 1.35)
(16.5, 1.6)
(0.57, 0.33)
(10.02, 1.2)
(1.02, 0.52)

Site
Warning Device

Reaction Time (s)
Initial Speed (m/s)
Initial Brake (m/s2 )
Final Speed (m/s)
Final Brake (m/s2 )

The PDF of each variable should be able to address the variations of driver behavior and
other factors in the period of data collection. Driver behavior depends on human factors including
gender, age, health condition, alcohol/drug use, etc. Other environmental, vehicular, and road
factors—including time of day, day of week, weather, temperature, light, vehicle type, model year,
tire pressure, pavement, and geometric designs—may affect the likeliness of a crash occurrence
and the severity of injury if a crash occurs. These safety factors may change over time and their
temporal stability is crucial in assessing the impact of safety countermeasures [25,26]. The PDFs are
obtained from the collected samples that the temporary instability issue can be addressed in the data
collection period; however, the sample characteristics may change over a longer period of time or
other than the data collection period. In addition, the unobserved heterogeneity [27] among safety
factors (e.g., pavement and light conditions) can be accounted for in the stochastic demand function
considering the total effect of all variables’ randomness to the stopping distance. After all, the risk
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of collision is generated from the demand function based on the supply threshold, and Monte Carlo
simulations provide the aggregate probabilities of all unobserved effects.
3. Results
3.1. Passive HRGC
At passive HRGCs, the supply thresholds depend on the train speed, transmission range,
sight distance to train, and the angle between the driving direction and vehicle to train direction.
The demand function is the same for CV and non-CV drivers, different supply thresholds are used in
Designs 2017, 1, 2
7 of 10
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three demand functions are used in the calculation of risk of collision. Three supply highway
distances (141.4, 176.8, and 212.1 m) are used to compare the risk of collision for the CV and non-CV
at active HRGCs as illustrated in Figure 3. The corresponding V2V transmission ranges are 200, 250,
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3.2. Active HRGC
At active HRGCs, the supply thresholds depend on the sight distance to HRGC and transmission
range projected on the highway. The demand functions are different for the CV and non-CVs, and
three demand functions are used in the calculation of risk of collision. Three supply highway distances
(141.4,
176.8,
Designs 2017,
1, 2 and 212.1 m) are used to compare the risk of collision for the CV and non-CV at active
8 of 10
HRGCs as illustrated in Figure 3. The corresponding V2V transmission ranges are 200, 250, and 300 m
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of sight obstruction, good driver vision, and a conspicuous train to perceive. Such a good combination
of conditions may not appear very often for most HRGCs. Considering the low cost ($350 [29]) of
OBU installations on trains and vehicle installations may reach 50% in 2021 [11], this safety
application is no doubt a cost-effective solution as compared to installations of safety devices or other
means for improving rural passive HRGCs with incident occurrences. For active HRGCs, most
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sight obstruction, good driver vision, and a conspicuous train to perceive. Such a good combination of
conditions may not appear very often for most HRGCs. Considering the low cost ($350 [29]) of OBU
installations on trains and vehicle installations may reach 50% in 2021 [11], this safety application is
no doubt a cost-effective solution as compared to installations of safety devices or other means for
improving rural passive HRGCs with incident occurrences. For active HRGCs, most drivers would
stop their vehicles by perceiving the activated gates and flashers, the CV application can still provide
additional protection to CV drivers by advising the train arrival time. With the provision of train
arrival time, impatient CV drivers should be less likely to drive around the gates if they know the
exact arrival time of an approaching train.
Margins of safety have already been considered in the evaluations of risk of collision. The CV’s
risk of collision at 600 m transmission range is less than 0.1 as compared to 0.5 of non-CV’s in the
passive HRGC. Even in the case of 500 m transmission range, the CV’s risk of collision is 0.25 still
much lower than the non-CV’s 0.5. A wide safety margin has been reserved by adopting a 600 m
transmission range. Emergency scenarios such as drivers’ late reaction, a train’s warning message loss,
or other unexpected factors, may increase the risk of collision; nonetheless, the safety should not be
compromised by providing a sufficient margin of safety.
5. Conclusions
With sufficient transmission ranges, the CV application can improve the safety at HRGCs by
reducing the risk of collision. The CV’s risk of collision is lower than the non-CV’s when a sufficient
transmission range is provided at passive and active HRGCs. The transmission range at passive
HRGCs is vital to the prevention of train collisions. A 600 m transmission range is desirable at passive
and active HRGCs. With the provision of a 600 m transmission range, the risk of collision for the CV is
lower than that for the non-CV with a 300 m sight distance at the passive HRGC. At active HRGCs,
given a 300 m transmission range, the risk of collision for the CV is lower than that for the non-CVs.
Overall, a 600 m transmission range is feasible to improve the safety at passive and active HRGCs.
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Kasalica, S.; Vukadinović, R.; Lučanin, V. Study of Drivers’ Behaviour at a Passive Railway Crossing.
Promet—Traffic Transp. 2012, 24, 193–201. [CrossRef]

Designs 2017, 1, 2

10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

10 of 10

Rudin-Brow, C.M.; George, M.F.; Stuart, J.J. Human Factors Issues of Accidents at Passively Controlled Rural
Level Crossings. Transp. Res. Rec. 2014, 2458, 96–103. [CrossRef]
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Available online: https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/01/12/2016-31059/federal-motor-vehicle-safety-standards-v2v-communications
(accessed on 20 January 2017).
Hartong, M.; Goel, R.; Farkas, C; Wijesekera, D. PTC-VANET Interactions to Prevent Highway Rail
Intersection Crossing Accidents. In Proceedings of the IEEE 65th Vehicular Technology Conference, Dublin,
Ireland, 22–25 April 2007; pp. 2550–2554.
Bezzina, D.; Sayer, J. Safety Pilot Model Deployment: Test Conductor Team Report; Rep. No. DOT HS 812 171;
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Washington, DC, USA, 2015.
Faber, M.H.; Stewart, M.G. Risk Assessment for Civil Engineering Facilities: Critical Overview and
Discussion. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2003, 80, 173–184. [CrossRef]
On-board Systems Requirements for V2V Safety Communications; Surface Vehicle Standard J2945/1;
SAE International: Warrendale, PA, USA, 2016.
Ang, A.H.S.; Tang, W.H. Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning and Design; John Wiley: New York, NY,
USA, 1975; Volume 1.
Ellingwood, B.; Galambos, T; MacGregor, J.; Cornell, C. Development of a Probability Based Load Criterion for
American National Standard; US Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, USA, 1980.
Mordechai, S. Applications of Monte Carlo Method in Science and Engineering; InTech: Rijeka, Croatia, 2011.
Available online: http://www.intechopen.com/books/applications-of-monte-carlo-method-in-science-andengineering (accessed on 5 January 2016).
Metropolis, N.; Ulam, S. The Monte Carlo method. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 1949, 44, 335–341. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
49 CFR 234.225—Activation of warning system; Federal Railroad Administration: Washington, DC, USA, 1998.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways
and Streets; AASHTO: Washington, DC, USA, 2011.
Tey, L.-S.; Wallis, G.; Cloete, S.; Ferreira, L. Modelling driver behaviour towards innovative warning devices
at railway level crossings. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2013, 51, 104–111. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Moon, Y.J.; Coleman, F. Highway-Rail Quad Gate Operation Time by System Simulation of Dynamic
Dilemma Zone. J. Trans. Eng. 2003, 129, 253–261. [CrossRef]
Hsu, C.-J.; Jones, E.G. Sensitivity analyses of stopping distance for connected vehicles at active highway-rail
grade crossings. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2017, 99, 210–217. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Behnood, A.; Mannering, F.L. The temporal stability of factors affecting driver injury severities in
single-vehicle crashes: Some empirical evidence. Anal. Methods Accid. Res. 2015, 8, 7–32. [CrossRef]
Behnood, A.; Mannering, F. An empirical assessment of the effects of economic recessions on
pedestrian-injury crashes using mixed and latent-class models. Anal. Methods Accid. Res. 2016, 12, 1–17.
[CrossRef]
Mannering, F.L.; Shankar, V.; Bhat, C.R. Unobserved heterogeneity and the statistical analysis of Highway
accident data. Anal. Methods Accid. Res. 2016, 11, 1–16. [CrossRef]
Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Dedicated Short-Range Communication Services in the 5.850-5.925
GHz Band; Federal Communications Commission: Washington, DC, USA, 2006.
Harding, J.; Powell, G.R.; Yoon, R.; Fikentscher, J.; Doyle, C.; Sade, D.; Lukuc, M.; Simons, J.; Wang, J.
Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications: Readiness of V2V Technology for Application; Rep. No. DOT HS 812 014;
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Washington, DC, USA, 2014.
© 2017 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

